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Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU
Enlargements∗
La´szlo´ A´. Ko´czy†
Abstract
We discuss the two latest enlargements of the EU. While the 1995
entrants are by now fully integrated, the 2004 entrants will “enjoy” a
secondary status for a number of years. We attribute this difference to
the fact that unlike the former EFTA members joining in 1995, the 2004
entrants formed a group with heterogenous interests, one that lacked the
same strong internal economic ties. Not being able to act as a unified
block they had a considerably weaker bargaining position. We support our
arguments by qualitative results from a simple model, a dynamic partition
function game based on Yi (1997) and Morelli and Penelle (1997).
JEL codes: C71, F15, F42
Keywords: European integration, externalities, path dependence
1 Introduction
World War II divided Europe into three zones: the Soviet area of influence,
the NATO countries and the countries that were at least formally neutral. In
a few years, more or less the same structure could be observed for the trading
blocks. Communist countries have formed the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (or Comecon), the Marshall Plan gradually grew into the predecessor
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of the European Union and the countries rejecting the political union formed
the looser European Free Trade Association.
This structure has not remained unchanged for long. First, we saw a migra-
tion of members from the EFTA to the European Economic Community. Then,
after the fall of the Iron Curtain and as Comecon was disbanded, the former
Comecon members sought entry into the European Community (later: Union)
and the first –large– wave of applicants has already joined the EU.
The two latest extensions of the EU have been remarkably different. The
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden is without doubt a success1 and now
it is hard to tell them apart from the former members. On the other hand,
the 2004 expansion was only possible after a number of concessions mostly
from the side of the applicants and it will be several years before they can
enjoy the same status as former members; one feels that the original ideas of
Schuman on equality suffered an injury. While Baldwin (1995) claims that this
transition is advantageous to the incumbents, we cannot say the same about the
entrants. There can be many reasons: the unprecedented differences between
entrants and old members, the cost of the expansion, or the entrants’ poor
economic performance. Disregarding these arguments we look at the differences
in bargaining position and strategy, discussing both possibilities and the actual
actions taken, using a game theoretic approach.
With its rapidly developing literature coalitional game theory contributes a
lot to the better understanding of integration. The latest developments allow us
to account for externalities, such as the side effects of forming coalitions. Of the
numerous possibilities the partition function form, introduced by Thrall (1962)
and Thrall and Lucas (1963), a generalisation of the characteristic function form
is the most suitable for our discussion. We also rely on the work of Yi (1997)
in using a set of conditions to express the negative externalities of mergers.
After the introduction of the notation, terminology and a historical overview
we will discuss the accession game, where a number of applicants try to get
membership in a coalition represented by a special player (cf. the apex game
Bennett and van Damme (1991)), called the Union, as Morelli and Penelle (1997)
following the optimal path: a sequence of coalition structures that maximises
1Although the expectations were not that high: Flam (1995).
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the present value of future payoffs not independent of the behaviour of other
players.
2 Game Theoretic Foundations
In this section we introduce the key elements of our model.
2.1 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of players. A subset C of the players is called
a coalition. A coalition structure P = {C1, . . . , Ck} is a partition of the player
set into disjoint coalitions. Π(C) is the set of partitions of C. The set Π(N)
will be denoted Π.
In the game it is the entire coalition structure that determines the payoffs.
A partition function, introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963), assigns a payoff
for each coalition in each coalition structure. The discrete partition function
(Lucas and Macelli, 1978) is a variant that assigns a payoff to each player in
each coalition structure. In this paper we consider the symmetric case:
Definition 1 The per-member partition function is the function
v : Π −→ RN ,
v = (v1, . . . , vn) .
The pair (N, v) is a per-member partition game.
The per-member partition function assigns an n-vector v(P) to each partition
P. Then if coalition structure P forms and player i belongs to coalition C ∈ P
such that |C| = m,the payoff player i gets is vm(P). Without loss of generality
it is assumed that vm(P) ≥ 0 if there exists C ∈ P such that |C| = m and
vm(P) = 0 otherwise.
Now we can explain the game in more detail. By the above property all
players belonging to coalitions of the same size are identical, but we allow iden-
tical players to make a decision in which they have different fates. The players
are assigned to these different roles by fair draws, and hence they choose this
strategy if –not disregarding others’ strategies– the expected worth of this lot-
tery dominates other strategies. At each move players who enforce the move are
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called perpetrators, while the rest are the residuals (in the terminology of Ray
and Vohra (1997)). As, in Ray and Vohra (1997), the definition of the residual
coalition is often arbitrary, we use the term less formally. We assume that the
perpetrators’ set is always minimal for inclusion. As a corollary if the set of
coalitions of size k is not smaller in partition P than in P ′ then the two are
separated by a move, all players in a coalition k in P ′ are in k in P, too. The
significance of this rule will be understood later.
2.2 Customs unions and externalities
The formation of a customs union or a free trade area affects the welfare of
the member countries, but also that of the outsiders. These outside effects are
called externalities.
There is an extensive literature on these welfare effects; here we only mention
Bond and Syropoulos (1996), Yi (1996), Syropoulos (1999) and Bond et al.
(2004). While some of this recent literature has clearly been prompted by the
expansion of the European Union, its focus is more on the overall effect rather
than on the effect on the expanding Union, the entrants and potential entrants
in the process. Yi (1996), on the other hand, focuses on the acting players and
established the following results on the nature of externalities in such games.
Condition 1 v (ni,P) > v (ni,P ′), where ni ∈ P ∩ P ′ and P is a refinement
of P ′. This expresses that mergers hurt those outside the merger.
Condition 2 v (nj ,P) < v (k,P ′), where k =
∑j
i=1 ni
1. P = P ′ ∪ {n1, n2, . . . , nj} \ {k} for some partition P0 of n− k,
2. ni ≥ nj ∀i,
that is, a merger with coalitions that are not smaller is beneficial to the members
of the coalition.
Condition 3 v (nj ,P) < v (ni + 1,P ′), where P ′ = P\{ni, nj}∪{ni + 1, nj − 1},
ni ≥ nj, that is, a member of a coalition is strictly better off by leaving the coali-
tion and joining another that is not smaller.
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Condition 1 formalises the finding of (Richardson, 1999) that “non-member
concerns about CU [Customs Union] formation are well-founded” confirming
the observation that as the (predecessors of the) EU expanded the remaining
European countries felt increasingly excluded. Condition 2 goes further: merg-
ing with a group that is larger in size is beneficial: As a special case we have
that joining any of the groups is beneficial.2
2.3 Path dependence
The basis for our game is like the game also used by Yi (1997): The initial
partition is given exogenously. Players form cooperative and therefore bind-
ing agreements and the new coalition structure is formed. However, unlike Yi
(1997), we consider a infinite-horizon repeated version of this model, where the
coalition structure formed in the kth game becomes the initial partition for the
k + 1st game.
Most of the literature deals with myopic players, that is, with players that
only focus on maximising the immediate result of an action. Recently Chwe
(1994), Xue (1997), Xue (1998) and Ray and Vohra (1997) have worked with
farsighted players. Here players only focus on the final outcome, and not the
intermediate stages. This approach is unsuitable for our model as the pace at
which customs unions develop is slow: we prefer to have the benefits now, and
not centuries later. Our players are foresighted: At each period they collect a
flow payoff and a player’s aim is to maximise the present value of its income
over the entire process. This approach is more general than myopia and far-
sightedness and it reproduces them as extreme cases.
We are therefore not only interested in the final outcome, but also the path
by which it is attained. The concept of examining paths is due to Morelli and
Penelle (1997). We give the basic definitions, introduce a more general notation
and proceed to the set-up of our own model.
Definition 2 (Move) A move is a single “action” per player, that is: an agree-
ment is settled, the necessary draws are made, the proposed coalitions are formed
2Bond et al. (2004, Proposition 5.) show that the formation of a free trade that is too
small with respect to the rest of the world can be welfare-reducing for its members. Their
analysis, however, focuses on the formation of a single group.
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and payoffs are paid out.3 Let also Πf (P) be the set of feasible partitions after
a move starting from P. (We will allow Πf (P) 6= Π for some P ∈ Π.)
Definition 3 A path pi is a sequence {Pi}i>0 of partitions such that Pi+1 ∈
Πf (Pi). Let Pt (pi) denote the partition after playing the game t times along pi.
Definition 4 The present value for the player (m,P) along path pi from P is
the discounted average of the payoffs along path pi that players of type (m,P)
obtain, and is denoted by wm (pi). Let Φm be the set of paths that can be enforced
by the same player, assuming rational behaviour from the others. The expected
present value or shortly value is defined by
wm(P) = max
pi∈Φ
wm (pi) , (1)
and the optimal path
pim ∈ argmax
pi∈Φ
wm (pi) , (2)
A path is a solution if the outcome cannot be improved and the corresponding
game is coalition-proof, stationary and subgame perfect (Bernheim et al., 1987;
Morelli and Penelle, 1997). Formally: Let pit denote the subpath after time t,
that is, pit = {Pt,Pt+1, . . . }. Then the path pi∗ is a solution to the game if for
all time t ≥ 0, coalition C ⊆ N and path pit ∈
⋃
m∈C Φ
m there exists m ∈ C
such that
wm(pit) ≤ wm(pi∗t )
and Pt = PT implies pi∗t = pi∗T . Such a path is finite or has a ubpath infinitely
repeated we write it as:
pi =
{P1,P2, . . . ,Pλ−κ+1, . . . ,Pλ} (3)
where λ ∈ N is the length of the path is. The length is then maximal, such that
for all i ≤ λ and j ≤ λ,Pi = Pj implies i = j. The last κ partitions form the
equilibrium outcome that is repeated forever, forming a loop that is non-trivial
unless κ = 1.
We assume that there exists a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1.
3Other approaches would allow interaction between two players at a time or allow only
self-enforcing strategies (too slow/too fast communication).
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Such solutions do not always exist, and so we will discuss special cases in the
next sections. In general, however, finding the solution is mathematically not
too difficult. By stationarity, the solution can be written in the special form in
Equation 3, and as the same partition can only appear once, the number of such
paths is finite. Ko´czy (2002) and Konishi and Ray (2003) provide additional
results on the properties of such paths.
3 The history of European integration
The history of the European Union is a history of expansions and one that
is unlikely to stop in the near future. In the following we briefly review the
milestones of European integration.
3.1 A war heritage
World War II redrew the political map of Europe. The treaty of the Yalta
Conference created an unprecedented division of Europe where East and West
entered different paths of development. The Cold War started. With Europe
battered in the war, neither France nor the United Kingdom could match the
emerging Soviet superpower in Europe and a long-term strategic alliance with
the United States and with each other was necessary. An accelerated reconstruc-
tion programme was started under the Marshall Plan in 1947. It has helped the
reintegration of the European economies, and to correct the distortions caused
by the war and the long military preparation before that. An important aspect
was that it required cooperation among the European countries. Notably it in-
cluded (West) Germany, on the other hand, countries under the Soviet influence
could not benefit from the plan, but formed the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (Comecon) instead.
3.2 Integration on the West
3.2.1 The European Union
The cooperation under the Marshall Plan has become the cradle of the Schuman
Plan, announced by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, originally refer-
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ring to a cooperation between France and Germany, but leading to the forma-
tion of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 with Belgium,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany participating.
The aim of the agreement was to pool the steel and coal resources of the partic-
ipating countries. While the word “peace” often reoccurs in the proposal and
related speeches, it is clear that the goal was to create a European economy
that could defend itself against a Soviet aggression. While the Cold War has
not always been that “cold”, the military conflicts in Korea and Vietnam have
left Europe largely unaffected allowing the members of the ECSC to consider
long-term plans and a steady and balanced development. On 1 January 1958,
Belgium, France, Western Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
formed the European Economic Community (EEC) with the ultimate aim of a
total economic and political union. In 1967 the three communities: ECSC, EEC
and Euratom fuse to form the European Communities (EC). With the Maas-
tricht Treaty (in 1992) the EC becomes the European Union (EU) in 1993. It
shall not lead to confusion if we refer to the predecessors of the EU by the same
terms.
3.2.2 The European Free Trade Association
While the EEC had no military aspects the fact that all of the founding members
were members of the NATO deterred countries insisting on military neutrality,
from joining. On the other hand, by Condition 1 the formation of the EEC pro-
duced negative externalities: these countries felt excluded from the EEC mar-
kets. To compensate for this, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Austria, Switzerland and Portugal, formed a looser alliance, the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), in 1960 (Iceland joined later, in 1970, Finland in
1986 and Liechtenstein in 1991). Already then the EU was considerably larger
than the EFTA: Its members had a very good access to EFTA markets, but
poor access to the much larger markets of the “inner six.” So by Condition 3 it
is not surprising that as soon as the economic impact of the EEC started to be
felt the United Kingdom and Denmark decided to leave the EFTA and join the
EEC.
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3.2.3 Western Europe realigned
Condition 3 could have explained if the entire EFTA would have been swallowed
by the EU, so why did this not happen? The EU is more than a simple customs
union and not all countries are willing to give up even part of their indepen-
dence in favour of joint political goals. Remarkably, the EFTAns that stepped
over in 1973 are both NATO members, therefore the remaining EFTAns could
have political reasons. Norway is a special case: it is a NATO member, it has
expressed interest in joining the EU already twice, but entry was voted down
by national referenda on both occasions.
Ireland was the first country joining the EU without being a NATO mem-
ber. Here the economic points, namely that its main trading partner, the UK,
joins, have outweighed possible political concerns. Ireland may have been the
first, but not the last. Previously unaffiliated countries wanted to join these
trading blocks (Condition 2) and they have chosen the EU almost unanimously:
In the subsequent years the EU has gained Greece in 1981, Spain in 1986, while
the EFTA could only get Finland, already allied with EFTA from 1961 and
Liechtenstein, who has already been a member via its ties with Switzerland, the
EU has gradually won over many more of the former EFTA members: Portugal
in 1986 and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995 (as a consequence of Con-
dition 3). It was, in fact, likely that by 1995 all EFTA members would join.
We have already discussed Norway’s case above, the remaining EFTA countries
are not likely to join the EU due to their special interests: Iceland had some
disagreements with the EU on fishing regulations. Since this would affect an
important part of the economy, it is understandable that Iceland prefers to keep
the status quo in the sense of staying out. Iceland’s physical distance is surely a
factor here. Switzerland has a good reputation of independence. While Switzer-
land’s EU membership is an issue raised again and again, the benefits may or
may not outweigh the loss due to the loss of the aforementioned reputation - a
factor, our symmetric model cannot account for. Liechtenstein would object to
EU tax rules. Although not members, these countries are tied to the EU via a
series of agreements.
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3.3 Integration on the East
3.3.1 Comecon
While the annexation of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC’s)
under the Soviet influence would not have received a world-wide approval, for
the purposes of the Communist dictatorship this was just a slight technical
detail. A highly centralised economic and military block was formed. Here
we are interested in the first: Comecon has established in 1949. The central
planning covered all aspects of the economy often allocating entire industries to
certain countries. Currencies were non-convertible outside the community, and
exchanged at fixed rates within. Lack of market mechanisms or expertise, the
admission of developing countries, corruption, the resistance of the population
all contributed to the gradual decline and the eventual disbandment in 1991.
While the former member were now free to choose their own ways, they
inherited distorted economies from the old regime on the one hand, and lost
the trading partners they had for the last 40 years. While foreign investment
could help the first problem quickly establishing trade relations with Western
European countries and each other (Condition 2) was necessary to overcome the
second.
3.3.2 The Visegra´d Countries (V3 then V4)
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have been the three exemplary transi-
tion economies. These countries have, since the start, been at the forefront of
political and economic development among the former Communist countries.
Their common past, similar level of development and common aims made them
natural allies. Referring to their historical Visegra´d summit in 1335 4 these
countries formed the Visegra´d Group in 1991. Since the split of Czechoslovakia
into Czech Republic and Slovakia the group has four members and aims at a
similar cooperation as the Benelux: while each member is too small to make
an impact individually, with 60 million inhabitants in total it can hardly be ig-
4The economic, trade and political agreements forged between King Charles I of Hun-
gary, King John of Bohemia, King Casimir III (the Great) of Poland, Margrave Charles of
Moravia and other rulers of lesser importance at the (then) Hungarian capital Visegra´d in
1335 included, for instance, the creation of a trade route that bypasses Vienna.
10
nored.5 This group focuses on deep rather than wide cooperation and therefore
has not admitted additional members.
3.3.3 The Central European Free Trade Agreement
The same countries have signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement
(CEFTA) at the end of 1992 (in force since March 1993). While the Visegra´d
Group was focusing more on (external) politics, the CEFTA saw itself as a
vestibule to the EU: member states prepared for the economic environment
within the EU by eliminating tariffs among them. Unlike the Visegra´d Group,
the CEFTA admitted new members, Slovenia joined in 1996, Romania in 1997,
Bulgaria in 1999, and Croatia in 2002. Initially some of the Baltic states have
also expressed interest in joining, but by the time they would have joined
they have also been offered membership in the EU, making participation in
the CEFTA obsolete. Since the founding countries have joined the EU its sig-
nificance has declined significantly.
3.3.4 Cooperation with Western Europe
By the time the Comecon has collapsed the EFTA was a dwarf compared to the
EU. It is no surprise therefore that the latter was more attractive.6 Yet, due
to its more open nature, EFTA was more welcoming, which led to a number of
bilateral agreements. The process of the Eastern extension of the EU has also
started, but after an initial burst of enthousiasm, when it was believed that the
first wave could join in a matter of a few years, it has slowed down dramatically
and it was only in 2004 that the first former Communist countries could become
members of the EU.
This extension has been rather different from the previous ones. It is often
referred to as one that stands out by its size. Well, looking at the number of new
flags in Brussels this may be true, but actually the extension of 1973 was larger
5A notable difference is that the Benelux Group consists of two large countries of compara-
ble size plus a smaller one, while in the Visegra´d group Poland is almost twice as large as the
rest put together. Its different interests as a large country in the EU and less clear benefits
from cooperation might question its long term interests in the Visegra´d group.
6Suppose that they join the EFTA, then by Condition 3 they would prefer to go over to
the European Union.
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in terms of population not to mention the relative increase. The real difference
is, however, between the wealth of the old and new members. While in previous
extensions substantial efforts have been made to reduce these differences now
–in EU terms– poor entrants could become net contributors. The outcome is
clearly a compromise. By 2004 the EU has become very large and by far the
dominant trading partner for most applicants. While these countries did not
have the possibility to join before at least 1989, if we try to project a different
history where they would have had they would have experienced the effect of
Condition 1 manifold: Staying outside the EU is very undesirable. The entrants
of 2004 were much more ready to make concessions in exchange of the entry than
applicants ever before.
4 The Accession Game
4.1 Introduction
In this section we define the accession game: a game of the extension of a special
coalition St, with |St| = st at time t that we refer to as the union. We make
the following simplifying assumption:
Assumption 1 (Monotonicity) We will restrict our attention to paths where
the union does not secede, that is, if S ∈ Pt (pi) then there exists S′ ∈ Pt+1 (pi),
such that S ⊆ S′, that is the size of the Union is monotone increasing.
As a result for all nontrivial games there exists P ∈ Π such that Πf (P) 6= Π.
Note that, although the above assumption is strong from a theoretical point
of view the history of the European Union justifies it: apart from some overseas
territories no members have left the EU and this monotonicity is unlikely to
change in the near future.
We can have two definitions of the applicants’ sets, A: the set A0 = N \ S0
for all t is the natural definition in the sense that it does not change in the
course of the game. The alternative we use, A = N \St, on the other hand does
not preserve history; as soon as some of the applicants join S, a new game is
considered with fewer applicants, so that the game can be solved inductively.
12
We define value for A and S, as the mean of the members’ values. As
wS0 (P) = 1
s0
∑
i∈S0
wi (P) = 1
st
∑
i∈St
wi (P) = wSt (P) ,
and S0 ⊆ St the interests of the original and current members of the union
coincide.
The focus of the solution is on the conflict between the sets A and S. Al-
though the game is not aimed to model the formation of the cooperative agree-
ment, each step of the game can be pictured as a bargaining procedure: If no
offers are made by the union or the offers are not accepted the applicants play
the disagreement strategy, repartition themselves to obtain the highest value
without acceptance. The union makes its most preferred offer. This is accepted
if a subset of applicants is willing to take it, and is able to enforce it. If it is
not, then the union makes further offers as long as these give improvement over
the disagreement strategy.
The first of the two approaches we consider is the pure non-transferable
utility game. In the other approach we allow transfers among applicants so
the applicants’ aggregated preferences are expressed by their total value in the
proposed partition. The latter approach is preferred by the applicants as it
maximises their value along the optimal path. The difference in the approaches
is small if the payoffs for the members of the Union S are considerably larger
than for A: the benefit of one applicant being accepted outweighs the others’
losses.
Before we go to the general results, consider the following example.
4.2 An example
Table 1 shows the payoffs of game G. (The payoff v (s+ 1, {s+ 1, 1, 1}) must
be read from the column with ≥ s at the top, and along line {s+ 1, 1, 1}.)
As the union cannot secede, expanding Π by looking further “back” into the
past of union does not increase the set of feasible outcomes Πf . Thus we can
have an inductive argument: first solve for the case when we have 0 applicants
(partition P6), and then given the solution for i-applicants, we can solve for i+1
applicants. The number of applicants is finite, so in a finite steps we arrive to
the case we aim to solve.
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vG 1 2,3 ≥ s
P6= {s+ 3} 4
P5= {s+ 2, 1} 0 5
P4= {s+ 1, 2} 2 6
P3={s+ 1, 1, 1} 1 7
P2= {s, 3} 3 3
P1= {s, 2, 1} 1 4 4
P0= {s, 1, 1, 1} 2 5
Table 1: Payoffs of game G
For 0 applicants the solution is trivial.
For 1 applicant we argue as follows: By monotonicity, set of possible strate-
gies is {P5,P6}. If no acceptance offer is made by the union or the offers are
not accepted (we call this the disagreement strategy), the applicants’ maximal
payoff is 0 by moving to P5. In this case the union S gets 51−δ , while at partition
P6 it would get 41−δ as calculated in the previous step. Hence it makes no offers
for the applicant.
When no offer is made in the 2-applicant case A plays P4 giving 61−δ to the
union S. The union makes only offers with a higher payoff: P3. The applicants
have homogeneous interests and hence a self-evident preference-ordering accord-
ing to the expected payoffs along the various possible paths: P6,P5,P4,P3. As
the state P4 can be achieved anyway, the applicants will only accept offers that
are better than that; in this case we have no such moves, so P4 is played.
When we have 3-applicants, we deal with P0 and P2 first. Although for the
applicants P2 is no better than playing P1, it gives the union S a lower payoff
and is still credible. The disagreement payoffs are therefore wA = 3 11−δ and
wS = 3 11−δ which is the lowest of all strategies for S. The applicants prefer P6
most and hence this is played.
In partition P1 the applicants have inhomogeneous preferences. Since the
pair does not want to merge with the singleton, the non-cooperative outcome
is P1, giving w1 = 11−δ , w2 = 41−δ , ws = 41−δ . The table above summarises
the steps as the different preference orderings are evaluated with the relation
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P1 Stage I Stage II Stage III Stage IV
1 P4 > P6 > P3 > P1 > P5 P4 > P3 > P1 > P5 P4 > P3 > P5 P4 > P3
2 P5 > P6 = P3 = P1 > P4 P5 > P3 > P1 = P4 P5 > P3 > P4 P3 > P4
s P3 > P4 > P5 > P1 = P6 P3 > P4 > P5 > P1 P3 > P4 > P5 P3 > P4
Table 2: The evaluation of preference orderings for P1 in game G without utility
transfers.
signs expressing preferences. In stage I we can remove the strategies that are
dominated by the disagreement strategy for the union (P6). From here the
strategies are eliminated from backwards. The last chance to improve payoffs
before disagreement is P5. In stage II the pair is willing to accept this and
can enforce it after acceptance, so the “offer” P1 is never made. Foreseeing
these actions, the singleton will accept the previous offer in stage III, P4, as it
improves its payoff, and it can enforce it. This is the worst possible outcome
for the doubleton, it is willing to accept the previous offer P3, and can enforce
it, and hence this is the outcome for the game. The union exploited the tension
among applicants very well: its first offer is accepted, for the applicants P6
Pareto-dominates this outcome. Table 3 summarises the calculations.
If we do allow transfers among applicants the singleton can compensate the
2-coalition when moving to P2, and thus the strategy offering the lowest value to
the union S becomes a credible threat, and P6 is played. Remarkably, transfers
never take place, as the threat is never executed; as soon as the union believes
that transfers could take place, a better outcome is achieved.
4.3 An interpretation
While the payoffs in the above example have been chosen arbitrarily, it perfectly
illustrates the issues that can arise in an extension like the ones in 1995 or in
2004. If we disregard the -certainly not unimportant- special feature of the EU
that it has a large central budget and new contributors are more welcome than
beneficiaries a single (poorer) country has a limited chance for being accepted7.
On the other hand the integration of the applicants outside the union does not
7Single country extensions in the past have been more on political than economic grounds.
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Game G P m pi∗ w
0-applicants P6 s+ 3
P6	 4 11−δ
1 0
1-applicant P5
s+ 2
P5	
5 1
1−δ
2 2 1
1−δP4
s+ 1
P4	
6 1
1−δ
2-applicants
1 1 + 2 δ
1−δP3
s+ 1
P3,P4	
7 + 6 δ
1−δ
3 3 + 4 δ
1−δP2
s
P2,P6	
3 + 4 δ
1−δ
1 1 + δ + 2 δ
2
1−δ
3-applicants P1 2
P1,P3,P4	 4 11−δ
s 4 + 7δ + 6 δ
2
1−δ
1 2 + 4 δ
1−δP0
s
P0,P6	
5 + 4 δ
1−δ
Table 3: Values and optimal paths for game G.
only bring potential benefits to them, but also results in negative externalities to
the the union. These externalities are unlikely to compete with those produced
by the union, but, as in this example, may be sufficient to outweigh the cost of
admitting new members.
This example also demonstrates the significance of cooperation, or even: sol-
idarity among applicants. In the case of the expansion in 1995 the applicants
were long trading partners and formed a well-organised groups. In case of a re-
jection they could have continued working in the framework of the EFTA. While
at the time of the negotiations such considerations were not probably central,
we see now a number of, often large countries being either refused membership
in the EU (like Ukraine recently), or experiencing a very slow progress in the
negotiations (like Turkey, Croatia or Bulgaria) and for these countries, as well
as some of the 2004 entrants, the pre-1995 EFTA could have been an alterna-
tive. The more countries chose this alternative, the more attractive would it
be. While this is no more than speculation, it is a fact that EFTA has existed
for decades before the 1995 EU-extension. On the other hand an often bitter
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competition emerged among the Visegra´d countries. Countries ranked top in
various EU, IMF, etc. reports have tried to exploit their advantage, hoping
early membership. As we know this strategy has failed, and it has, over the
years, destroyed the solidarity among these applicants. On the other hand even
the admission rules make it clear that their free trade area, CEFTA has no long
term ambitions providing a very weak outside option. The fates of the EFTA
and the CEFTA after these departures confirm our points: the EFTA, though
smaller, is still a functioning free trade agreement that maintains special rela-
tions with the EU, but looks also beyond Europe to look for new preferential
trading partners. The CEFTA became largely dysfunctional: as an indication,
its (unofficial) website has not been updated since 1999. It has not been very
successful in recruiting new members, and with its members conducting most of
their trade with the EU, and little with each other it is hardly useful as a free
trade area, its members share common political rather than economic goals.
Our example is also a game that satisfies the conditions of Yi (1996), but
where the grand coalition does not necessarily form. This can be explained by
the fact that we do not have an open membership game, that is, entry requires
EU-permission. It is also true that in our model we overlook countries that are
neither members nor applicants.
4.4 The general form
In the general accession game we allow transfers among the applicants. Such
a game even with an arbitrary number of applicants simplifies to a two-player
game between the union S and the applicants A. At each partition P, given the
corresponding Πf (P) the next move is determined as follows.
Given P, both S and A can assign a value to any outcome in Πf (P). Given
these, the union proposes its favoured partition. The applicants can either
accept this, or reject it, in which case the Union makes further proposals as
long as these are better than the disagreement strategy:
PD ∈ arg max
P′∈Πf
|S|∈P′
{
wA (P ′)}
By perfect knowledge, applicants may choose their most preferred offer. This is
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an equilibrium by construction and formally we have the solution:
P∗ = arg max
P∈Πf (P0)
{
wA (P) ∣∣wS (P) > wS (PD)} (4)
Alternatively, if offers are made by the applicants, then
P∗ = arg max
P∈Πf (P0)
{
wS (P) ∣∣wS (P) ≥ wA (PD)}
If the decision is made in a symmetrical way, the solution is more complex, we
have something similar to the classical problem of the Battle-of-Sexes except
that we do not allow randomised strategies. In many real life situations one
of the strategies becomes a focal point, but in a theoretical problem gives little
help.
4.5 Solving the general accession game
Our solution will be inductive. Let Πa = {P ∈ Π|n− s = a} the set of par-
titions with exactly a applicants. For a = 0, Π = {{n}} and the solution is
trivial. When solving for a + 1 we assume that for all P ∈ Πk with 0 ≤ k < a
the solution is known. Now let
ΠaD = arg maxP∈Πa
vA (P) the disagreement set,
Π+ =
{
P ∈
n−s0⋃
a=0
Πa
∣∣∣∣∣wS (P) > minPD∈ΠaD wS (PD)
}
the set of offers,
Pa ∈ arg max
P∈Π+
wA (P) the accepted offer in the case of a applicants.
Let b ∈ N such that Pa ∈ Πb. Then starting from the initial partition P ∈ Πa
we have the following results:
pi∗ (P) =
{P,P
a} if b = a
{P} ∪ pi∗ (Pa) otherwise,
(5a)
wA (P) =
v
A (P) + δ vA(Pa)1−δ if b = a
vA (P) + δwA (Pa) otherwise,
(5b)
wS (P) =
v
S (P) + δ vS(Pa)1−δ if b = a
vS (P) + δwS (Pa) otherwise,
(5c)
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5 Conclusions
Baldwin (1994, pp130-139) describes the “hub-and-spoke bilateralism” model,
where the European Union has arrangements with each applicant separately.
In our model this corresponds to the union and a set of singletons. This setup
is favourable for the Union, but not for the applicants. Candidates may im-
prove their average position by forming a coalition, such as the aforementioned
EFTA, Visegra´d or the Baltic countries have. Since the EU – not necessarily
malevolently– favoured some countries over others, and these made every effort
to exploit their advantage these alliances were not always and equally success-
ful. Such divisions reduce the average chance for acceptance. Allowing transfers
between the applicants could help to overcome this difficulty and give a more
efficient outcome.
There are some questions that we leave open. In larger games or if we do
not make our monotonicity assumption loops can arise. While a solution is still
feasible it is more difficult to characterise it. The present model is still very
simple and extensions can prove to be more descriptive. Morelli and Penelle
(1997) discuss how different utility transfers affect the accession path; our ex-
ample shows that even the uncertainty about the transfers can influence the
outcome. Also, our model does not directly build on models of international
trade. While our aim was to preserve simplicity, a more detailed model can
deliver additional insights.
While the present model is a very limited one, it can already illustrate a
number of aspects in the enlargement process. What do these say about possi-
ble future extensions? Future applicants will be increasingly eager to join the
EU, and they will have to act strategically to achieve this: Intensive cooperation
will be necessary. While the 2004 extension has paved the way for future en-
largements, it will still keep eurocrats busy for a while so major extensions are
not very likely in the near future. Those countries with membership aspirations
should prepare for a long fight, ideally joining their forces. The EU should on
the other hand consider drawing an outermost border: Yi (1997) and others
have shown that unless we play an open membership game, the grand coalition,
that is an EU covering the entire world is not optimal. If so, then there is a limit
somewhere. If the EU is also planning to deepen integration the cultural and
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political homogeneity will also play a role. Limiting cooperation with others
to trade in the fashion of the European Economic Area, membership will be
restricted to countries who share the same culture, religion, respect for human
rights and even history.
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